home

1 | 2 | 3 | 4

About the Author

Back | Next

Steele spent the rest of 1863 and the first three months of 1864 helping local Unionists establish a loyal civilian government for Arkansas.  The general reluctantly resumed offensive operations in late March 1864, leading 14,000 blue soldiers from Little Rock and Fort Smith into southwest Arkansas.  Steele’s objective was Shreveport, Louisiana, on the Red River, where he was supposed to rendezvous with a larger Union army and a gunboat flotilla under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks for an invasion of Texas.  Six thousand Rebel cavalry under Sterling Price played hell with Steele’s supply line.  They managed to capture two large trains of enemy supply wagons, annihilating the equivalent of two brigades that Steele had detailed for escort duty.  After Steele reached Camden, a port on the Ouachita River 120 miles south of Little Rock, he learned that Banks had been stopped on the Red River and was in full retreat.  In addition, three Confederate infantry divisions from Louisiana were trudging north to trap and destroy what remained of Steele’s army.  Steele managed to extricate his troops from the trap and conduct a successful retreat to Little Rock after fighting his pursuers to a standstill at Jenkins’ Ferry on April 30, 1864.  Nevertheless, the ill-conceived Camden Expedition had cost the Union Army 2,500 casualties, hundreds of wagons, and thousands of horses and mules. 

Once again, the tables had turned in Arkansas.  Confederate morale revived.  While Rebel forces were not strong enough to retake Little Rock, Fort Smith, Pine Bluff, or Helena by direct assault, there were plenty of opportunities for large bodies of gray cavalry to raid north of the Arkansas River and subject the Federals to steady attrition.  Such activities also emboldened guerrilla bands, who contributed to the Union Army’s growing discomfort.  It became so difficult and dangerous to transport supplies up the Arkansas to Fort Smith that the Lincoln administration briefly considered abandoning that important outpost.  There is no telling what would have happened had the Confederates not thrown away their advantage. 

Sterling Price had acquitted himself well in preventing Steele’s Federals from overrunning southern Arkansas.  Unfortunately, Price remained obsessed with driving the Yankees out of his beloved Missouri, and he pestered his superiors incessantly until they gave him leave to pursue his most cherished dream.  On September 19, 1864, Price entered Missouri with 12,000 Confederate cavalry.  His raid threw the state and eastern Kansas into a tumult, but Northern commanders massed sufficient forces to subject Price’s column to a series of stinging blows.  By the time Price limped back into Arkansas on December 2, only 3,500 Rebel troopers were still with him, and two-thirds of them had lost their weapons.  Everything the Confederacy had managed to gain in Arkansas the previous spring had been squandered by Price’s vanity and provincialism.

With the destruction of the main Confederate army in Arkansas, irregular warfare became the last viable option for battling Federal authority.    The state had been transformed into the haunt of numerous guerrilla bands in June 1862 when General Hindman called for a popular uprising to oppose the first Union attempt to capture Little Rock.  Hindman’s General Orders Number 17 instructed “all citizens from this district” to organize themselves into ten-man companies under elected captains and start killing Yankees.  An estimated 5,000 men responded to this summons by August 1862.  They may not have been a decisive factor in Samuel Curtis’ failure to take Little Rock, but they aroused the ire of Union forces by picking off sentries and couriers, ambushing small patrols and foraging parties, and firing on gunboats and transports.  Federal commanders announced that they would hold civilian responsible for any guerrilla activity occurring in their vicinity.   When warnings failed to restrain the irregulars, details of Union soldiers and sailors began burning small hamlets or individual houses and barns.  This retributive strategy caused many Arkansans to abandon their homes in the delta and north of the Arkansas River, but it did not suppress guerrilla depredations.

The Union Army found an effective guerrilla fighter in Colonel Marcus LaRue Harrison, a former railroad surveyor who commanded the Unionist 1st Arkansas Cavalry.  Harrison’s regiment consisted of rugged “Mountain Tories” from northwest Arkansas, and they spent the last two years of the war stationed in the area where they had been born and raised, which meant they were already acquainted with the political sympathies of its inhabitants.  Harrison turned out to be almost as familiar with his surroundings as his men, as he had mapped most of northern Arkansas before the war.  After conventional methods failed to end the guerrilla scourge, Harrison introduced a revolutionary approach in the latter half of 1864.  He established a network of fortified “farm colonies,” populating them with the families of men who swore to serve in home guard companies.  Anyone living within ten miles of a colony had to join it or was assumed to be a bushwhacker.  Harrison’s 1st Arkansas Cavalry patrolled between this fast-growing outpost network, killing or capturing men who refused to submit to the new system.  Harrison’s troopers fed their horses on the bountiful hay grown by loyal farmers, which allowed the 1st Arkansas to subject the enemy to constant harassment.  With guerrillas isolated from the general populace, Harrison’s methods started scoring dramatic results.  His troopers killed more than 100 guerrillas in February and March 1865 and forced some of the larger Rebel companies to disperse.  Harrison’s post colony system spread into other parts of Union-controlled Arkansas.  By the time General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and other organized Confederate commands had surrendered, Arkansas’ Rebel guerrillas were also ready to cease their struggle against Federal authority.  

The Civil War was the greatest catastrophe that the United States has ever endured, and no part of the nation suffered more than Arkansas.  More than 6,800 of the 60,000 Arkansans who joined the Confederate Army died of wounds, accident, or disease, a mortality rate greater than 10 percent.  At least 1,700 white Unionists and 1,500 blacks died while in Federal service.  No one has compiled accurate statistics on the number of white civilians murdered by guerrillas or retaliating troops, or the number of runaway slaves gunned down by Confederate soldiers.  Land values plunged from an assessed average of $5.32 an acre to $2.21.  Vast quantities of livestock were stolen or slaughtered.  The devastating impact of such violence and destruction caused perhaps as many as half of the state’s white population to move elsewhere.  Arkansas’ black population also dropped by approximately 50,000 souls.  Governor Isaac Murphy, the head of Arkansas’ wartime Unionist government, did not exaggerate when he confided to a friend in August 1865:  “Our state is a picture of desolation.  The great majority of the people are reduced to poverty.”

This wonderful web site, Arkansas in the Civil War, provides students, scholars, and legions of Civil War buffs with convenient access to how the Northern and Southern press reported the Civil War in Arkansas.  Events in Arkansas engaged the interest of Americans during that tumultuous era.  They formed part of the big picture for the generation that weathered America’s most terrible crisis, and they need to be more familiar to subsequent generations that attempt to understand the course and meaning of the American Civil War.   

About the Author

Gregory J. W. Urwin was born and raised in northeast Ohio, where he graduated summa cum laude from Borromeo College of Ohio in 1977.  He earned his M.A. at John Carroll University in 1979 and his Ph.D. at the University of Notre Dame in 1984.  He taught from 1984 to 1999 at the University of Central Arkansas, and then moved to Temple University, where he is a professor of history and associate director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy.  He is the author or editor of eight books on American military history, including such Civil War titles as Custer Victorious:  The Civil War Battles of General George Armstrong Custer, Black Flag over Dixie:  Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, and A. F. Sperry’s History of the 33d Iowa Infantry Volunteer Regiment 1863-6 (co-edited with Cathy Kunzinger Urwin).  Urwin was a historical consultant for “The Edge of Conflict:  Arkansas in the Civil War,” a documentary series that won a 1995 regional Emmy Award for the Arkansas Educational and Television Network.  His future plans include writing a book about Union Army operations in Arkansas from the summer of 1863 through the spring of 1864.  Urwin is a Fellow of the Company of Military Historians and his publications have won the General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Award from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation and the Harold L. Peterson Award from Eastern National.  He also delivered the Twenty-fifth George Bancroft Memorial Lecture at the U.S. Naval Academy in October 2004.

1 | 2 | 3 | 4

Back | Next

 

     
 

 
     
 

 
     

Website design © 2000-2007 HarpWeek LLC
All Content © 1998-2007 HarpWeek, LLC
Please submit questions to support@harpweek.com