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Unlike Major Smith, most of the other 7,645 Confederate soldiers poised to
storm Helena harbored no premonitions of death or defeat. “We were told,”
testified Lieutenant William H. H. Shibley of the 35th Arkansas Infantry, “that
the Federals were entirely ignorant as to our approach; that the city would be
very easily taken and everything in like manner until some almost thought we
would take the city with but little fighting or probably find the city
evacuated.”16
The chain of events that propelled this naďve little army to Helena began on
May 23, 1863, when Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon urged that
friendly forces west of the Mississippi mount a major operation to help relieve
their comrades besieged in Vicksburg. Seddon also asserted that an “attack on,
and seizure of, Helena, while all the available forces of the enemy are being
pushed to Grant’s aid,” would “secure a great future advantage to the
Confederacy.” It took until June 14 for Seddon’s recommendation to reach Little
Rock and Lieutenant General Theophilus H. Holmes, the elderly, infirm, and
indecisive commander of the District of Arkansas. Holmes was enjoying an
unaccustomed spell of resolution thanks to the receipt of a mistaken report from
his cavalry. Gray troopers prowling around the outskirts of Helena claimed that
the Union garrison had been stripped to the bone to bolster Grant. On June 15
Holmes wired Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, his immediate superior and
the commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department: “I believe we can take
Helena. Please let me attack it.” The following day, a telegraph operator at
Kirby Smith’s Shreveport headquarters clicked this encouraging reply: “Most
certainly do it.”17
The army Holmes mobilized to reclaim Helena consisted of Major General
Sterling Price’s 3,095-man infantry division and Brigadier General John S.
Marmaduke’s 1,750-man cavalry division from Jacksonport, along with Brigadier
General James F. Fagan’s 1,339-man infantry brigade from Little Rock. These
units were to rendezvous with Brigadier General L. Marsh Walker’s 1,462-man
cavalry brigade, which was already posted outside Helena with orders to deny the
Federals knowledge of Holmes’ advance. “The march upon Helena was really
terrible-especially for infantry,” reported Major Henry Ewing of Marmaduke’s
staff. Four straight days of heavy rains in eastern Arkansas flooded rivers,
creeks, and bayous, turned the roads to mud, and threw Price’s struggling foot
soldiers off schedule by seventy-two hours. This delay gave Prentiss the extra
time necessary to foil Walker’s efforts to shroud Confederate movements and
intentions with secrecy.18
Holmes arrived at the Allen Polk house on the morning of July 3. There he
convened a council of war to divulge his plan of attack. The district commander
made it clear to his generals that he considered Battery C on Graveyard Hill at
the center of the Union line “to be the strongest of all the enemy’s works, and
the key to all his defenses.” To seize this crucial point, Holmes assigned
Price’s division, his strongest formation, and he stressed that he wanted
Battery C carried and held at all costs. The remaining Rebel infantry in Fagan’s
brigade received the job of taking Battery D on Hindman Hill directly south of
Battery C. Holmes designated Marmaduke’s division to capture Battery A on
Rightor Hill northwest of Helena. Walker’s brigade would shield Marmaduke’s left
flank and go on to occupy the city once Rightor Hill fell.19
Holmes desired a synchronized attack against Helena’s long defensive
perimeter. Instead of choosing a specific time to engage the enemy, however,
Holmes announced, “The attack on Helena will be made to-morrow at daylight.” As
it turned out, not all of Holmes’ officers defined “daylight” the same way he
did, which would lead to unnecessary confusion and delays the next day.20
Between dusk and midnight, different elements of Holmes’ army left their
bivouacs and started out for their jumping-off points nearer Helena. “The night
was a beautiful one,” observed Lieutenant Shibley of Fagan’s brigade. “The moon
and stars shone beautifully and all nature seemed unconscious of the awful deeds
we soon expected to execute.” At 1:30 a.m., General Fagan detached Colonel
William H. Brooks, the 34th Arkansas Infantry, three cavalry companies, and an
artillery section from the brigade’s column. The general instructed Brooks to
stage a demonstration at daylight against the works south of town. Fagan wanted
Brooks to prevent the Federals posted there from sallying forth to menace the
brigade’s right flank.21
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