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Mount Vista towers
over the Arkansas River. The view is to the northwest with the Van
Buren waterfront out of sight to the right. In this postwar image
the horse-powered ferry has been replaced by a steam-powered craft.
Courtesy University of Arkansas at the Little Rock
Archives and
Special Collections.
The Battle of Prairie Grove
sputtered out as darkness fell on Sunday, December 7, 1862. The Confederates had
staved off a series of furious Union assaults but were desperately low on
ammunition. The Federals seemed determined to renew the struggle in the morning,
so Major General Thomas C. Hindman, the Confederate commander, decided to
withdraw to the safety of the Arkansas Valley. The soldiers of the
Trans-Mississippi Army slipped away during the night, leaving behind their dead,
most of their wounded, and their hopes of liberating Missouri before the onset
of winter. After a difficult crossing of the Boston Mountains the Confederates
settled into a string of camps on the north side of the Arkansas River near the
town of Van Buren.
Hindman intended to remain in the Arkansas Valley until spring
and have another go at Missouri, but the overtaxed logistical system on the
western edge of the Trans-Mississippi Department was on the verge of collapse.
“It was all we could do to procure supplies enough to barely live on,” recalled
Silas C. Turnbo of the 27th Arkansas Infantry. “Corn bread mixed with part of
the bran, corn meal bran coffee, and a very limited supply of exceedingly poor
beef was our only diet.” Chronic hunger was compounded by exposure. Tents,
blankets, and coats were in short supply, and soldiers suffered terribly as the
weather turned cold and wet. Lieutenant General Theophilus H. Holmes, commander
of the Trans-Mississippi Department, visited Hindman’s command in mid-December
and was appalled at what he found. “I have never seen such ruinous losses by
disease,” he exclaimed to a friend. Desertion was epidemic, especially among
conscripted Arkansans and disillusioned Texans. The long-suffering
Trans-Mississippi Army was on the verge of disintegration.1
Holmes directed Hindman to shift his command one hundred miles
down the Arkansas River to Lewisburg (present-day Morrilton), where food and
forage were more plentiful. Hindman complied with his usual brusque efficiency
and the Confederates began moving east on the south side of the river. A
regiment of Texas cavalry and a brigade of Arkansas infantry stayed behind to
maintain a Confederate military presence on the border with the Indian
Territory, a matter of considerable political importance. Several hundred
commissary and quartermaster troops also remained behind to transfer the army’s
sadly depleted stockpiles of food, clothing, and equipment onto a small flotilla
of transports at Van Buren and Fort Smith. The vessels were to move downstream
in conjunction with the marching columns and provide logistical support. By
December 28 some of the transports were full, or nearly so, others were still
taking on stores. There was no particular sense of urgency. After all, the
Federals had been quiet since the bloodbath at Prairie Grove three weeks earlier
and no one seriously expected them to lunge across the Boston Mountains and make
an appearance in the Arkansas Valley.2
* * *
Forty miles north of the
dwindling Confederate encampments along the Arkansas River, the Army of the
Frontier slowly recovered from its hard-fought victory at Prairie Grove. The
nominal commander of the Union army was Brigadier General John M. Schofield, but
he was convalescing from a serious illness in St. Louis under the stern eye of
Major General Samuel R. Curtis, commander of the Department of the Missouri. In
Schofield’s absence the man in charge of Union operations in northwest Arkansas
and the Indian Territory was Brigadier General James G. Blunt, a hard-driving
and hard-drinking amateur soldier from Kansas. Blunt’s normal role was
commanding officer of the First (Kansas) Division. His principal subordinate was
Brigadier General Francis J. Herron of Iowa, another gifted military amateur,
who led the Second and Third (Missouri) Divisions. Blunt and Herron shared
certain traits. Both were bold and aggressive leaders who chafed under
Schofield’s erratic leadership. During Schofield’s extended absence they
conferred regularly, got along famously, and often acted as if they were
co-commanders of the army. “The most perfect understanding exists between
Generals Herron and Blunt,” declared a Union officer who knew both men. “They
cooperate well, and handle the rebels without gloves.”3
On December 23 Blunt learned that Schofield was on his way back
to northwest Arkansas to resume command of the army. Blunt was distressed by the
news. He feared, correctly as it turned out, that Schofield would abandon
northwest Arkansas and the Indian Territory and nullify most of the strategic
gains achieved at Prairie Grove. About the same time Blunt received reports from
spies and informants that Hindman was preparing to move east. With Schofield
coming and Hindman going, Blunt decided to take one last swing at the rebels
while he had the chance. He issued orders for a raid into the Arkansas Valley.4
Blunt’s objective was Van Buren, a prosperous port on the north
bank of the Arkansas River a few miles downstream from Fort Smith. Captain Jacob
D. Brewster of Herron’s staff claimed that the idea of a raid originated with
his superior: “A few days ago General Herron took it into his head ‘what a fine
trip could be made.’ With a part of the Staff we went over to General Blunt’s
Head Quarters, eight miles distant, the same evening, and General Herron made
the proposition to General Blunt to attempt the trip. The latter at once
assented and the plans were decided.” Brewster was an avid Herron partisan and
his version of events probably should be taken with a grain of salt. It is worth
noting that Herron did not claim sole credit in a letter he wrote to Curtis:
“Some days after the battle of Prairie Grove, General Blunt and myself decided
upon an expedition to Van Buren, but the weather was such as to prevent any
movement at that time. On Christmas night we met and arranged the details,
fixing the starting time on the morning of the 27th instant.”5
One day after the meeting with Herron, Blunt informed Curtis of
his intentions: “I shall move upon Van Buren tomorrow morning with all of my
best troops, leaving my transportation this side of the mountains.” The
reference to transportation was Blunt’s way of assuring Curtis that his sojourn
in the Arkansas Valley would be brief. Blunt later explained his thinking: “I
determined to move on [Hindman] rapidly, surprise and attack him in detail, or
in other words, while the river divided his force, to defeat those on the north
side, and then, if the river could be crossed, attack those on the south side.
Preparations for this movement were made with the utmost expedition and
secrecy.” Blunt clearly believed that a substantial portion of the Confederate
army was still camped on the north side of the river. He did not realize that
most of the rebels already were out of reach.6
Blunt expected Hindman to put up a fight and decided to take most
of his infantry, cavalry, and artillery on the raid. Union camps buzzed with
excitement as everyone prepared for a rapid and strenuous movement. Soldiers
were cautioned to march with only their arms, overcoats, blankets, and as much
food and ammunition as they could stuff into haversacks and saddlebags. Men
deemed too ill or weak to take part were instructed to stay behind and guard the
camps and trains. “So there is to be another forced march but where, is the
question,” mused a soldier in the 11th Kansas Infantry. Some believed that the
army was bound for Tahlequah or Huntsville, while others were convinced that
Little Rock was the objective. “Secresy was everything so that up to the hour of
starting, except the Generals and Staffs, no one knew where the party was going
to,” explained Captain Brewster. “We both left our camps with tents pitched and
wagon trains just as they have been since the battle here, taking with us only
the ambulances and one wagon to each Regiment to carry provisions.”7
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