Approaching Helena from the northwest on the Old St. Francis Road, Marmaduke
dismounted his Missouri cavalrymen three miles from the city. A mile farther on,
he discovered “the road and country thoroughly obstructed, the enemy having
rendered almost impassable that approach to the fort [Battery A] and town.”
Trudging down the Upper Little Rock Road toward the other end of Helena, the
infantrymen of Fagan’s all-Arkansas brigade ran into a massive roadblock a mile
distant from Battery D. Fagan told his field and staff officers to get off their
horses. He did not foresee that decision would hamper his ability to control his
troops during the ensuing assault, and he pushed forward without either his
artillery or ammunition train. The route General Price followed to Graveyard
Hill was so rough that he ordered the fieldpieces belonging to the two batteries
that accompanied his division to remain behind until the sun came up. Those guns
were destined never to reach the front. Ever the optimist, Price issued rifle
muskets to details selected from each battery, taking the artillerymen along to
man the guns he expected to seize at Battery C. “Volunteers were called for from
the members of our battery to go in with the infantry and serve any guns that
might be captured,” remembered Sergeant William J. Bull of Captain Charles B.
Tilden’s Missouri Battery. “I was one of thirty-two volunteers.”22
Inside Helena, reveille at 2:00 a.m., July 4, brought 4,000 grumbling
Federals crawling from their tents. A tap of the drum called the blue infantry
into line, and the men waited and wondered what the day would bring. Sometime
after 3:00 a.m. the Yankees began hearing isolated shots ringing from their
picket lines. As that distant popping drifted closer, it also swelled in
frequency and volume until there could be no doubt that an all-out attack was
under way. Fort Curtis thundered its warning shot at 3:30 a.m., drummers sounded
the long roll, and the garrison’s units hastened to their battle stations.
Helena’s defenders belonged to General Salomon’s Thirteenth Division from the
XIII Army Corps, and he would make most of the important tactical decisions for
the Union side that day. Colonel Samuel A. Rice commanded Salo-mon’s right wing
and Colonel William E. McLean his left, while General Prentiss contented himself
with shouting encouragement to the troops to do their duty.23
Retiring grudgingly, Union pickets bought their comrades an hour’s time to
get into position. As the Rebel skirmishers gained ground, they came across the
contraband villages clustered outside Helena. Confederate soldiers regarded
runaway slaves as traitors to their masters and a threat to the Southern social
order. In at least two shanty towns, advancing skirmishers turned their rifles
on the blacks, killing and wounding unarmed men, women, and children. Lieutenant
Albert G. Foster of the 28th Wisconsin, whose company was on outpost duty that
morning, later testified: “The enemy fired on us as they came, but their
attention was taken for a short time with a camp of negroes . . . just inside
our picket line. How many of them were killed I never heard, but their screams
were terrible and the shooting by the enemy at close range soon ended the
scene.” A thick fog that clung to the battlefield until 8:00 a.m. helped to
conceal these atrocities from the Federals. It also provided the Confederates
with welcome cover as they crept within range of the enemy’s entrenchments.
Despite the haze, Fagan’s Arkansans soon realized that Helena had not been
evacuated. The fortifications looming above them were teeming with Yankees, and
the boys in blue were spoiling for a fight. “When we . . . saw the true state of
affairs,” Lieutenant Shibley reported, “men saw that the affair has been grossly
misrepresented, their courage failed and no small part of our Regt and I expect
of others also failed to go into battle to any extent.”24
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